Are people equally other-regarding when selecting a match vs choosing an allocation? by Belot, Michele & Fafchamps, Marcel
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are people equally other-regarding when selecting a match vs
choosing an allocation?
Citation for published version:
Belot, M & Fafchamps, M 2018, 'Are people equally other-regarding when selecting a match vs choosing an
allocation?', Southern Economic Journal, vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 1088-1108. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12267
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1002/soej.12267
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Southern Economic Journal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Belot, M. and Fafchamps, M. (2018), Are People
Equally OtherRegarding When Selecting a Match Versus Choosing an Allocation?. Southern Economic Journal,
84: 1088-1108. doi:10.1002/soej.12267, which has been published in final form at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/soej.12267. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
Are People Equally Other-regarding 
 
 
 
 
Are People Equally Other-Regarding When Selecting a Match vs Choosing 
an Allocation? 
 
Michèle Belot (Corresponding author) 
Department of Economics, European University Institute, Villa La 
Fonte, Via delle Fontanelle 18, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
(Italy). Tel. [+39] 055 4685 417/982. Email: michele.belot@eui.eu. 
 
Marcel Fafchamps 
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford 
University, Encina Hall, 616 Serra Street Stanford, CA 94305-6055 
(USA). Email: fafchamp@stanford.edu 
 
Keywords: Match selection, Partnership formation, Assignment process, Other-
regarding preferences, Efficiency, Equity 
JEL Codes: A13, C91, D61, D63, D64 
Abstract
There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the oppor-
tunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient
if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To
test this formally, we study how other-regarding behavior vary across two
decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when
they select a partner. In both settings each subject’s decision is final and it
affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that
that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well-being to
increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in
a large anonymous setting — even though the consequences on the material
payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that, in assignment
processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by present-
ing the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple
individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves.
1 Motivation
Economists and sociologists have long been interested in assignment pro-
cesses in which agents are matched without a pairwise price mechanism,
starting with the early work by Becker (1973). Examples of such processes
include: the matching of organ donors with recipients (e.g., Baccara et al.
2016); the assignment of students to schools, dorms, or work groups (e.g.,
Agarwal and Somaini 2016, Sacerdote 2001, Fafchamps and Mo 2016); and
marriage markets without dowry, bride price or pre-nuptial agreement (e.g.,
Becker 1973). Even in markets with a price mechanism, the assignment of
goods and services to individual buyers often is subject to random variation
due to fixed pricing or limited supply – e.g., queuing at the emergency room,
or lining up for fresh bread at the baker’s. In all these cases, match selection
plays a crucial role in the efficiency and equity of the resulting allocation
of resources – e.g., are goods or services going to those with the largest
consumer surplus.
In matching markets, the choices that people make often have conse-
quences on others because they effectively reduce the choice set of others.
This happens for instance when someone picks a product from the shop
shelf, sets an appointment with a dentist, or picks a child for adoption when
they reach the top of the queue. In all these examples, assignments typically
differ in aggregate efficiency and they generate different distributions of wel-
fare gains. Hence in the absence of a mechanism to adjudicate matches in an
efficient or equitable manner, the quality of the resulting allocation depends
on whether people internalize the externalities they impose on others. For
instance: do you take the last croissant on the shelf, or should you leave it
for the next consumer; do you take that early morning dentist slot or should
you leave it for someone with a more constrained schedule; do you pick that
young healthy kidney for yourself, or do you leave it for a younger recipient
further down the queue for organ transplants.
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In this paper we examine whether we can nudge people to make choices
that internalize their impact on others. To this effect, we compare individual
behavior in decisions that have identical consequences on payoffs for self and
others, but take different forms: either a pure allocation decision; or match
selection. We hypothesize that these decision environments trigger different
behavior. Pure allocation decisions resemble those taken within families
or organizations, and have been studied extensively in the experimental
literature. There is considerable evidence that experimental subjects behave
pro-socially in dictator games and other pie division games. This has been
interpreted as suggesting that people have other-regarding preferences (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt 1999). There is also abundant experimental evidence
that those who share less than fairly are subject to second or third-party
punishment – i.e., either by the recipient, as in the ultimatum game (e.g.,
Guth et al., 1982), or by a third-party observer (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). This suggests that, when making an allocation decision, people may
be influenced by norms of fairness, not just innate altruistic preferences.
In contrast, match selection puts individuals in competition with each
other. In such decisions, people often behave in a selfish or even rival man-
ner. The literature on decentralized matching describes match formation as
a market-like process. For markets, the original insight goes back to Adam
Smith’s shoemaker parable, and it has been verified in numerous market
experiments (e.g., Smith 1962, Roth et al. (1991), or more recently Falk
and Szech (2013), Bartling, Weber and Yao (2015), Kirchler et al. (2016),
Harbring (2010), Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010)). Becker (1973) of-
fers a similar result in the context of competition for mates. In a review
of the experimental evidence, Bowles (1998) observes that the more the ex-
perimental situation approximates a competitive (and complete contracts)
market with many anonymous buyers and sellers, the less other-regarding
behavior is observed.1 Smith (1998) points out that these two aspects of
human nature are not contradictory but apply to different contexts. Selfish
1This finding fits with the two apparently opposite views of Adam Smith who argues
in the Wealth of Nations (1776) that self-interest prevails in markets, while acknowledging
the pro-sociality of human nature in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
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behavior maximizes the gains from impersonal market exchange, while co-
operative behavior maximizes the gains from non-market personal exchange.
Little is known as to what role other-regarding preferences play in match
selection. The question is: do people apply competitive heuristics when se-
lecting a match; or do they behave pro-socially, as they do once partnerships
are formed?
To investigate this question, we design a novel experiment in which sub-
jects unilaterally choose between two alternatives. The choice they make
directly or indirectly determines their payoff as well as that of three other
participants. The purpose of the experiment is to test whether final payoff
allocations depend on the type of decision subjects make. To this effect,
the experiment is designed to ensure full information and to eliminate any
strategic interaction between subjects. This allows us to study behavior in
situations where people make unilateral assignment decisions.2
The main experimental variation across treatments is the way in which
the decision is framed. This places our paper within the broader literature
on nudging (e.g., Thaler and Sustein 2008). Most contributions to this
literature have sought to improve individual decision making. Our focus is
on inducing people to internalize the effect of their choices on others. To
our knowledge, this type of nudging has never been studied before. We
conjecture that framing a decision in a competitive and anonymous setting
induces people to behave in a competitive, and possibly rival manner. In
contrast, framing a decision like an allocation decision – similar to those
taken within the household – may nudge people to behave less selfishly.
Each experimental session involves 24 people equally divided into cat-
egories and types. Participants are first randomly assigned to one of two
neutrally labelled categories that are intended to capture the two sides of an
assignment process – e.g., organ donor and recipient. Within each category,
each subjects is assigned to one of two types – e.g., high and low – based
2Comola and Fafchamps (2016) implement a partner selection experiment with com-
petition. They show that experimental subjects are quite adept at competing for a good
partner and almost always converge to a stable match. Here the focus is on the role of
other-regarding preferences in selecting a match or choosing a pie allocation.
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on their performance in a real effort task. Type partly determine payoffs.
In each session, we have 6 participants of each combination of type and
category. The payoff matrices used in the experiment are chosen to enable
us to discriminate between different types of other-regarding preferences:
pro-social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2006);
invidious preferences (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Fafchamps and Shilpi
2008); and preferences for efficiency (Charness and Rabin 2002). To achieve
this objective, payoff vectors are designed such that some participants receive
higher average payoffs than others. If participants are inequality averse, the
behavior of high payoff subjects reveals variation in expressed altruistic pref-
erences across treatments, while the behavior of low payoff subjects reveals
variation in expressed invidious preferences.
The first treatment we introduce is a dictator allocation decision in-
volving the dictator and three other subjects. Each group of four subjects
includes one high and one low type from each category. Participants are
asked to choose between two divisions of payoffs among the four of them,
with no reference to partner selection. The second treatment revolves around
the same allocation problem, but the decision is framed as a choice between
a high or low partner from the other category. The unchosen partner is
then automatically matched with the remaining participant from the deci-
sion maker’s category. The match pattern determines payoffs. In the third
treatment the allocation problem is also framed as the choice of a high
or low partner, except that each potential partner is not a uniquely (but
anonymously) identified subject but is selected at random among the six
participants in that type-category cell. In all three treatments, the decision
of one of four players is selected at random and implemented in a unilat-
eral manner to determine the payoff of all four. Going from Treatment 3
to Treatment 2 changes the size of the group (large group vs. small group)
but keeps the decision as a partner selection decision. Going from Treat-
ment 2 to Treatment 1 changes the type of decision from partner selection
to allocation decision. In the first treatment, the implications that decisions
have on others’ material payoffs are obvious. Although they are the same in
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Treatments 2 and 3, they become increasingly less salient as we move from
Treatment 1 to Treatment 3.
In our three experimental treatments we find that participants mostly
follow their material self-interest. This is in line with numerous studies of
behavior in market games. We nonetheless find that the propensity of high
payoff subjects to behave altruistically is significantly lower in the large
group Treatment 3 than in the small group Treatment 2. We find a similar,
albeit smaller difference between Treatments 2 and 1. This is consistent with
the idea that subjects are more altruistic in a pure allocation decision than
in a match selection decision – possibly because, in the former, the impact
of their decision on others is more salient. We also uncover some evidence
that, in Treatment 2 and especially Treatment 3, low payoff subjects are
more likely to behave in an invidious manner – i.e., they are more likely to
select a partner that reduces others’ payoff at the expense of a reduction
in their own payoff. As a result of the combination of these two sources
of behavioral variation, aggregate efficiency is lowest in Treatment 3 and
highest in Treatment 1.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design and the different treatments. The testing strategy and empirical
results are presented in Section 3 and we conclude in Section 4.
2 Experimental Design
Each experimental session includes 24 subjects. To avoid contamination
from one treatment to another, participants in a session only play one treat-
ment – i.e., we use a ‘between subject’ design. Subjecting participants to
multiple treatments would have exposed them to multiple frames, thereby
revealing the object of the experiment. This would have allowed contam-
ination across frames and probably triggered experimenter-demand effects
– hence making experimental results much harder to interpret. For this
reason we opted for a ’between subject’ design instead of a ’within subject’
5
design. Participants do, however, play the same treatment several times,
with a different payoff matrix each time.
2.1 Stages
Within each session the experiment is divided into two stages. In the first
stage, the pool of participants is divided equally and randomly into two
categories A and M .3 The two categories are intended to represent, in an
uncontextualized way, the two sides of a matching game, e.g., bride-groom,
employer-employee, or hospital-intern. Having been assigned to a category,
each participant individually completes a computerized task. Subjects are
asked to do simple calculations for a period of 3 minutes – additions or
multiplications depending on the category, A or M , to which they have
been randomly allocated. Based on their performance in the task relative to
other participants in the same session and category, they are assigned one of
two types – bottom 50% or top 50%. Here we denote the two types simply
as ‘high’ and ‘low’.
In the second stage of the experiment, participants are first informed
of their type (high or low) and then play six consecutive rounds of an as-
signment game. No feedback is provided to participants about the choices
of others until the end of the experiment, at which time they are only told
their final payoff. Since payoffs are based on one randomly selected round,
it is impossible for participants to infer the choices of other participants.
The purpose of this is to rule out repeated games and strategic play: each
round is de facto a dictator game with anonymous others and no feedback.
We consider three different versions of the second stage. In the first two
treatments, participants are assigned to groups of four. Each group consists
of a low and high type participant from each category.For each round, each
participant in each group selects his favorite pie/allocation. At the end
of the session, one subject from each group and one round are selected at
3In the experiment these categories are refereed to as ’Addition’ and ‘Multiplication’
– see below.
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random, and his/her choice determines the payoff of all four participants in
the group. The structure of the game thus resembles a dictator game with
four players.
The scenarios participants are confronted are perfectly equivalent across
treatments in terms of their implications for efficiency and income distribu-
tion. The only variation is the salience of these implications. Importantly,
we provide the same information in all treatments.
We now turn to the details of the protocol for each treatment.
Treatment T1 - Earnings division: In this treatment participants
are told that they are randomly allocated in groups of 4, composed of 2
M participants (one high and one low) and 2 A participants (one high and
one low). They are asked to choose between two distributions of earnings
that correspond to the earnings distribution in T3 and T2 (see Appendix
1). In Treatment 1 (T1) choices are presented as a selection between two
‘pies’ divided into four possibly unequal slices. Each choice is associated a
single pie that represents the division of earnings between the four people
in the group. Thus, the implication of the decision for efficiency and income
distribution is obvious and salient in this treatment. This treatment is also
the closest to the dictator game designs used in the literature on social
preferences (for a review, see Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Treatment T2 - Partnership formation - small groups: In the
second treatment, participants are told that they are randomly allocated in
groups of 4, composed of 2 people who did the multiplication task (one high,
one low) and 2 people who did the addition task (one high, one low). They
are asked to indicate whether they would prefer to form a partnership with
the low or high type participant from the other category (they are asked
to tick one of two boxes (top 50% or bottom 50%) at the bottom of the
answer sheet). They are shown how the payoffs would be distributed for
each possible partnership (high A/high M , high A/low M , low A/low M ,
low A/highM). They are also made aware of the implications of their choice
for the 2 other participants in their group (see Instructions for Treatment
2 in Appendix 1). The scenarios are presented on an answer sheet (see
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Appendix 1) in a manner similar to Treatment 3, except that we now write
explicitly the implication of the partnership decision for the other people
in the group. For example, if a participant in category M , say, selects the
high type in category A as partner, this also determines the payoff of the
two remaining players since they can now only be matched with each other.
As in Treatment 3, final payoffs are determined by randomly selecting one
round and one subject from each group, and letting his/her choice of partner
determine the payoff of all four participants in the group.
Treatment T3 - Partnership formation - large groups: In Treat-
ment 3 (T3), all 24 participants in a session play a partner selection game to-
gether as follows. Participants are organized in groups of 24 divided equally
into A and M categories. Each participant is asked to select one of two pos-
sible types of partners, high or low, among players of the other category (see
Instructions for Treatment 3 in Appendix 1). If their choice is implemented,
we randomly match them with one of the 12 people from the other category.
The scenarios are presented on an answer sheet (see Appendix 1). They are
shown the distribution of earnings associated with the four different types
of partnership (high A - high M , low A - low M , high A - low M , and low
A - high M), including those that do not involve them. These choices are
illustrated graphically with colored pies. The size of the pie represents the
total earnings to be shared. Each earnings division corresponding to each
partnership is represented with a pie division. Participants are asked to tick
one of two boxes (top 50% or bottom 50%) at the bottom of the answer
sheet.
Since the 24 participants are divided equally between categories A and
M , and subsequently divided equally between low and high type within
each category, there are six participants in each category × type4. Because
players are anonymous and there is no feedback, the choice of each player
resembles Treatment 2 except for the larger number of players. They are also
shown how the payoffs would be distributed for each possible partnership,
4If only 16 or 20 participants showed up to the session, there were 4 or 5 people of each
group (category and type).
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as in Treatment 2. But they are not told anything explicitly about the
implications of their choice for others. To understand these implications,
they need to understand that by choosing a partner of a certain type, they
prevent one person from their own category to be matched to a partner of
that particular type.
Payoffs in Treatment 3 are determined as follows. We first select one
category (A orM) at random as well as one of six rounds. We then aggregate
the choices of the participants in the selected category. If there is excess
demand for one type, then the scarce type is allocated in a random manner
between those who have expressed a preference for it. For instance, say
category A is selected. Of the 12 participants in category A, 8 have selected
to match with a high type. Since there are only 6 high types in categoryM ,
each of the 8 participants is allocated to a high type match with a probability
equal to 6/8, and a low type match with probability 2/8. The 4 participants
who have selected to match with a low type get their choice of type. The
payoff determination process is explained in detail to participants before the
experiment (see Instructions in Appendix 1 for details).
In treatment T1, it is obvious by design that selecting a pie affects one’s
payoff and that of three other players. In treatment T2, it is clear to each
player that their choice affects the payoff of the partner they choose. Given
the payoff determination rule, they can also deduce that selecting one part-
ner de facto forces the other two players together. Alternatively they may
follow a market logic and convince themselves that their choice directly af-
fects only one other player, and hence that their other-regarding preferences
only apply to that player.
In treatment T3 players can, as in treatment T2, clearly see the effect
of their choice on their – yet to be determined – partner. By taking one
possible partner away from the choice set of other participants, they also
de facto limit the choices of other players. This effect is less salient than
in treatment T3, however, an issue that we discuss in detail in Appendix
2. Because several rounds of randomization are needed to assign payoffs,
Treatment 3 may blur the sense of responsibility that participants associate
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with their actions.
2.2 Payoffs
Payoffs in the second stage of treatments 2 and 3 represent how gains from
matching are shared between matched partners. It is important to realize
that in each T2 and T3 scenario participants ultimately choose between two
possible pairings: (1) high A-high M / low A-low M or (2) high A-low M /
low A - high M . The first corresponds to positive assorting (i.e., high-high
or low-low), the second to negative assorting (i.e., high-low or low-high).
Each of the pairings has an associated total payoff for the four participants
affected by someone’s choice. Hence to each scenario is associated two pos-
sible efficiency values. In some scenarios positive assorting is efficient; in
others negative assorting is efficient. Treatment T1 mimics these differences
albeit without explicit partner choice and assorting.
As shown in Table 1, whether positive or negative assorting maximizes
someone’s material payoff varies by category and type, and according to the
sharing rule associated with a particular scenario. Gains are always shared
equally if both partners are of the same type (both high or both low). If
partners are of different types, the division of payoffs differs from game to
game. We call each payoff matrix a scenario.
In a session, all participants play 6 different scenarios. The scenarios
are the same for all the participants in the same session. The same set
of scenarios/payoff matrices is used for the three treatments. To facilitate
understanding, let us take the 4 people partnership selection setup as a
benchmark (Treatment 2). Players of each group and type receive a sce-
nario where they are asked if they would like to partner with a high or low
type player of the other group. The payoffs associated with this choice are
represented graphically (see Appendix 1 for screen shots). We use a set of 17
different scenarios. In 10 scenarios, payoffs are such that negative assorting
(e.g., low A with high M) is more efficient. In 6 scenarios, payoffs are such
that positive assorting is efficient. We also have one scenario where positive
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and negative assorting are both efficient.
We also vary how the gains from a match are divided. Continuing with
the 4 people partnership selection treatment as benchmark, we implemented
three different division rules. These are summarized in Table 1, which shows
how the joint payoff of two types of participants are divided between them.
As mentioned earlier, the sharing rule is always equal if both types are the
same. We only vary this sharing rule when the participants are of different
types (one high and the other low). That is, a low M type will be asked if
she wants to pair with (1) a low A or (2) a high A type and the implications
of her choice will be that in case (1) the joint payoff is divided equally (but
the two high types may receive a much higher payoff), while in case (2) the
division varies across different scenarios (either she gets 1/2, 1/3, or 1/6 of
the value of the match). We implement the same payoff structure in the
other treatments, but the way it is presented differs (see Appendix 1 for
screen shots).
Table 1. Possible sharing rules
Low A High A
Low M 1/2,1/2
1/2,1/2
1/3, 2/3
1/6, 5/6
High M
1/2,1/2
2/3, 1/3
5/6, 1/6
1/2,1/2
The scenarios are summarized in Table 2. The session-specific six dif-
ferent scenarios were chosen among the set of 17 so as to permit as unam-
biguously as possible the assignment of an individual subject to a specific
preference archetype. Correct assignment nonetheless requires that a sub-
ject play consistently according to a single archetype. We come back to this
in Section 3.2.
High types have higher payoffs on average, and low types have low pay-
offs. To help identify other-regarding preferences, we introduce a further
payoff differentiation between low A and low M payoffs such that low M
types get, on average, lower payoffs than low A types. Throughout the
analysis we present results broken down by these three payoff categories.
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2.3 Research questions and hypotheses
As mentioned earlier, the main difference across treatments is the framing
of the decision. To our knowledge, this experiment is the first to rely on
framing to induce subjects to internalize the effect of their choice on others.
We conjecture that, when faced with allocation decision, people are more
likely to apply heuristics taken from of choices made within the household or
family where norms of behavior usually involve redistributive considerations.
As a result, subjects may act in a more altruistic manner and thus pick a
more efficient solution. In contrast, when a decision looks like something
subjects would do in a competitive setting, people are more likely to behave
in a more competitive – and thus more selfish if not more rival – manner.
This is because norms of behavior allow self-interest in competing for mates
and for goods.
Treatment T1 is couched as an allocation process while Treatment T3
is presented as a match selection choice in an anonymous environment. We
are mainly interested in contrasting T1 and T3, but going from one to the
other varies two features at the same time: (1) the decision is either an
allocation decision or a match selection decision; and (2) the consequences
of one’s actions on others are easier to realize in T1 than T3. To distinguish
between these two possible effects, we introduce intermediate treatment T2:
as in T3, T2 involves the choice of a match; but as in T1 the implications
of the subject’s choice is on a specific set of individuals. The latter feature
makes it harder for the subject to avoid noticing the effect of their choice
on others.5
Comparing T2 to T1 gives the pure effect of framing a decision as a match
selection instead of a pure allocation choice. The main channel of influence
here is a heuristic effect: people recognize a familiar situation and behave
accordingly. Comparing T3 to T2 gives the additional effect of making
5We considered running a fourth treatment framed as an allocation decision involving
self and three randomly selected subjects, but concluded that the artificiality of the setup
would confuse subjects and yield unusable results.
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the effect of the subject choice on others less salient. There are several
possible reasons why salience may affect choices. Although the experiment
is not designed to distinguish among these explanations, it is nonetheless of
interest to identify their underlying mechanism, so as to enable the reader
to form an opinion on their possible relevance in our setting.
The first possibility is bounded rationality: the harder it is for people
to realize some of the consequences of their decisions, the more they focus
on the consequences they can most easily identify. This idea is related to
the literature on base-neglect (Grether, 1980), narrow-backeting (Rabin and
Weiszacker, 2009), and correlation neglect (Enke and Zimmermann, 2013).
A second possibility is a moral wiggle room effect (Dana et al. 2007
and Grossman, 2014): participants do realize the consequences of their ac-
tions on others, but the fact that they are less salient provides them with
an excuse for behaving more opportunistically. In the context of our ex-
periment, subjects may for instance expect (or pretend to expect) others to
act altruistically so as to accommodate their own selfish preferences. We
call this the accommodation hypothesis. We show in Appendix 2 that the
accommodation hypothesis is largely a fallacy – i.e., it is an excuse to act
opportunistically.
The literature on trolley experiments (e.g., Green 2011) provides a third
possible channel of influence: subjects who have clear preferences on out-
comes may nonetheless deviate from them to avoid becoming personally
implicated in the selection of an outcome. This typically occurs because
they regard certain choices as morally repugnant. Yet, if multiple layers of
intervening steps are added between their own action and the final outcome,
subjects are more likely to select the outcome they prefer. This reasoning
can be applied to our setup by noting that, in T3, several randomization
steps are required to select a final outcome. Applied to the contrast be-
tween T2 and T3, the reasoning is that selfish subjects may nonetheless act
altruistically in T2 because acting selfishly is morally reprehensible. But in
T3 the transformation of a selfish choice into a selfish outcome is mediated
by several randomization steps which exonerate the subject. We call this
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the dilution hypothesis and develop it formally in Appendix 2 to compare it
to the accommodation hypothesis. The main conceptual difference between
the dilution hypothesis and moral wiggle room is opportunistic intent, which
is present in the latter but not in the former.
3 Analysis and results
The experiment took place in May and November 2011 at the experimental
laboratory of the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS)
of the University of Oxford.6 284 participants took part in total. We ran 13
sessions in all (5 for T1 and 4 for T2 and T3). If less than 24 participants
showed up, we ran the session with either 20 (4 sessions) or 16 participants
(one session) and we divided participants in types and groups equally. Par-
ticipants earned ↔10.28 on average. No pre-selection criterion was used, all
participants were recruited through the CESS subject pool database using
ORSEE. The experiment was implemented with pen and paper.
The first objective of the experiment is to test whether play is systemat-
ically different between treatments and, in particular, whether decisions are
more sensitive to the payoffs of others and the saliency of the implications
of choices on others. The second objective is to test what type of prefer-
ence is most able to account for observed behavior. We report on these two
objectives in turn.
3.1 Sensitivity to the payoffs of others
Throughout we denote by pii the payoff of subject i and Ni be the set of four
players affected by i’ choice.7 We define efficiency as the sum of the payoffs
of the four participants affected by the choice of a single player.
6We ran the sessions corresponding to Treatment 3 in June 2011 and those correspond-
ing to Treatments 1 and 2 in November 2011.
7In T3, the exact individuals affected are unknown prior to ex post randomization, but
their payoffs are known since, by design, they belong to the four category × type groups.
See Appendix 3 for a formal demonstration.
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3.1.1 Variation across treatments
We begin by showing that play varies systematically with treatments. The
right panel of Table 2 presents the raw aggregate distribution of choices for
each scenario. We present the share of participants choosing a partner of the
same type. We observe large differences across types and across scenarios.
To analyze these differences, we begin by regressing the choices wits of
subject i of type t in scenario s on treatment dummies and session dummies.
All standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for pos-
sible interdependence across decisions for a given subject. We summarize
the results of these regressions in Table 3 for different types of choices. We
consider four types of choices, each presented in a separate panel. In the
first three columns of each panel are presented the predicted value of wist for
each of the three treatments. Results are presented separately for subjects
assigned to high payoff, low payoff in the A category, and low payoff in the
M category. As indicated earlier, low payoffs for subjects experimentally
assigned to the A category are higher than for those assigned to the M
category.
The last three columns present the test statistic and p-value of F -tests
of equality of means between treatments. All F -tests are based on esti-
mated regressions and thus correct for clustering at the individual level. We
present three separate tests: (1) whether there is no difference between the
treatments, i.e., whether T3=T2=T1; (2) whether there is a significance
difference between T2 and T1 – this estimates the pure effect of framing
the decision as a match selection vs. an allocation choice; and (3) whether
there is a difference between T3 and T2 – this estimates the salience effect
associated with anonymous mates between formally selected ex ante or ex
post.
We first report in the upper left panel of Table 3 the proportion of times
that subjects pick the choice that maximizes their individual payoff. We see
that this happens most of the time, with little difference across treatments
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– with only one exception, differences are not statistically significant. We
also note that the proportion of choices consistent with selfish preferences is
highest for participants with a low average payoff and lowest for participants
with a high average payoff.
The upper right panel of Table 3 shows the proportion of times that a
subject picks the choice that maximizes the payoff of the other three players
affected by their decision. As before, we report proportions under each of
the three treatments as well as the results of F -tests of equality of means
across treatments. We find that, on average, the proportion of choices that
maximizes others’ payoffs decreases systematically as we go from treatment
T1 to treatment T3. This is true for all player types, but is strongest and
highly significant for high payoff participants. For the lowest payoff types,
those in categoryM , the difference is not statistically significant at standard
levels. For low and high payoff participants, the fall in other-regarding
choices is significant both between T1 and T2 and between T2 and T3. In
other words, both dimensions of treatment – switching from allocation to
match selection, and reducing salience – reduce other-regarding behavior,
albeit less among those with the lowest payoffs – who act more selfishly
throughout.
In many cases, the choice that maximizes the payoff of others also maxi-
mizes one’s own payoff. This explains why it is possible for, say, high payoff
subjects in treatment T3 to maximize their own payoff in 80.7% of the cases
while at the same time maximizing the other players’ payoff in 52.3% of the
cases. To investigate this issue further, in the lower half of Table 3 we split
the choices that maximize others’ payoff depending on whether doing so also
maximizes one’s own payoff or not. A ‘good Samaritan’ spirit corresponds
to the case where participants maximize others’ payoffs even though doing
so reduces their own. This case is displayed in the lower right panel of Table
3. In the lower left panel we show the proportion of choices that maximize
others’ payoffs when doing so also maximizes the subject’s own material
payoff. Such choices are consistent with efficiency consideration but are less
remarkable from an equity point of view.
16
In the lower left-hand panel we find that participants are more sensitive
to aggregate efficiency in treatment T1 than in partner-selection treatments
T2 and T3. This is true for all three payoff categories, but differences in
behavior are statistically significant only for high payoff participants.
Turning to the lower right-hand panel, we see that the ‘good Samaritan’
spirit is generally highest in treatment T1 and lowest in T3. Difference in
behavior are large in magnitude, especially among lowand high payoff sub-
jects, and they are statistically significant for all payoff categories between
treatments T1 and T2. In other words, moving from an allocation to a
match selection frame significantly reduces subjects’ willingness to reduce
their own payoff in order to benefit others. This is a remarkable result, and
we believe this is the first time that such an effect is documented.
To investigate these findings in more depth, we test whether treatments
affect the sensitivity of participants’ choice to differences in payoffs between
the two options they face. Let ∆pii ≡ pi
h
i − pi
l
i be the gain in i’s payoff
from choosing a high partner (or equivalent allocation in T1). Similarly let
∆pi−i ≡
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ni
(pihij − pi
li
j ) be the gain in the payoff of the other three
players affected by i’s choice. To calculate the marginal effects of ∆pii and
∆pi−i on the probability of choosing a high partner (or equivalent allocation
in T1) we estimate a regression model of the form:
yi = ∆pii ⊗ T ⊗X +∆pi−i ⊗ T ⊗X + εi (1)
where T is a vector treatment dummies (i.e., T1, T2 or T3), X is a vector
of dummies for player types (i.e., high type, lowA type, or low M type).
∆pii ⊗ T ⊗ X is shorthand for all the possible interaction terms between
them and similarly for ∆pi−i ⊗ T ⊗ X.
8 Session fixed effects are included
throughout.
We report in Table 4 the estimated marginal effects with their t-value for
each of the T ⊗X combinations.9 What the Table reveals is that choice sen-
sitivity to the own payoff difference between the two options is comparable
8In other words, we include terms in pii, T , X, TX, piiT , piiX and piiTX where T and
X are themselves vectors of dummies. Similarly for pi−i, T and X.
9Regression (??) is estimated using logit with standard errors clustered at the individ-
ual level. Virtually identical results obtain using a linear probability model.
17
across treatments: a one unit increase in own payoff increases the probabil-
ity of choosing the more beneficial option by 5 to 6 percentage points across
all subject types and treatments. Since the standard deviation of ∆pii is
4.67, this is a large effect.
In contrast, choice sensitivity to ∆pi−i varies dramatically across treat-
ments and subject types. For high types – who on average earn higher
payoffs – sensitivity to ∆pi−i is absent in treatment T3 but present in the
other two treatments. The effect is large in magnitude: a one standard de-
viation (i.e., 7.67) increase in ∆pi−i raises the probability of choosing high
by 5.6% in treatment T2 and 8.9% in treatment T1. In treatment T3 the
effect is numerically 0. This suggests that among these players, redistribu-
tive considerations are eliminated in T3, a finding that is consistent with
the dilution hypothesis.
Results are different for low types. Here we find that, under anonymous
partner selection T3, participants in the low A category are at the margin
less likely to choose a high partner if other players benefit more from that
choice, controlling for their own payoff gain. The effect is large in magnitude:
a one standard deviation increase in ∆pi−i reduces the probability of choosing
high by 8.3% for low A subjects. The effect of one’s choice on others’ payoffs
is not significant for low types in Treatments 1 and 2.
These findings are to be read in the context of the literature on inequality
aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Okada and Riedl 2005). Experimen-
tal evidence has suggested that individuals display a desire to reduce the
difference between their payoff and that of others both from above and from
below. In other words, if a subject has a high payoff relative to other partici-
pants, this subject is often observed taking redistributive actions that reduce
the difference between her payoff and that of other participants. This is con-
sistent with the behavior of high types in our experiment, who have higher
average payoffs and, in treatments T2 and T1, are more likely to choose an
action that increases the payoff of other participants who, on average, earn a
lower payoff. In other words, high types often choose an action that reduces
the difference between their payoff and the lower payoff of others, but do so
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more often when the choice is framed as an allocation decision than a match
selection.
Also according to inequality aversion, a subject who has a low payoff
relative to others often takes actions that increase her payoff at the ex-
pense of others. This is what low A types do in T3: controlling for their
own payoff, these subjects are more likely to take an action that reduces
the payoff of others. What is interesting is that, in our experiment, the
two behaviors do not coexist: altruistic behavior (inequality aversion from
above) is only present in treatments that emphasize the effect one’s choice
has on several others; envy or spite (inequality aversion from below) is only
present in the treatment that blurs the effect of one’s choice on others. This
suggests that the dilution effect reduces altruistic/redistributive/efficiency
considerations, but not envy which is, rather, exacerbated by anonymity.
In other words, the two sides of inequality aversion respond differentially to
an anonymous partner selection environment: altruism and redistributive
norms are blunted by it, while envy is heightened. Next we show that the
two effects together combine to reduce the efficiency of participants’ choices.
3.1.2 Choices and efficiency
We now investigate the relationship between treatment and the efficiency of
individual choices. We ignore the 60 observations in which choices generate
the same total payoff for the four players. We focus on whether the choice
the subject makes is efficient or not. Across all subjects we see that, in
treatment T1, participants choose the efficient allocation in 70.2% of the
observations. This proportion falls to 66.7% in T2 and 60.9% in T3. These
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We reproduce this finding in the first column of Table 5. Treatment T3 is
the default category so that reported coefficients capture the efficiency gain
of individual choices in T2 and T1 relative to T3. We see that efficiency is
higher in T2 and, especially, T1 than in T3. The difference between T1 and
T2, however, is not statistically significant.
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In the other columns of Table 5 we disaggregate the results and regress
the efficient choice dummy on treatment for each of the three types of par-
ticipants. The results indicate that the T1 and T2 are associated with more
efficient choices for both high types and low A types. For low M types, the
treatment effects are not significant although, in terms of average efficiency
across all treatments, low M types are not statistically different from other
payoff categories. It appears that an anonymous partner selection setting
such as T3 leads higher payoff participants to behave in a more selfish man-
ner while in treatments T2 and, especially T1, they may feel moral pressure
to behave altruistically towards lower payoff participants. In contrast, low
M types do not seem to have these concerns. This could be because they
feel more entitled to pursue their self-interest, having been assigned to the
lowest payoff category at the onset of the experiment.
3.2 Preference archetypes
In this section we check the robustness of our findings using a more structural
approach. Our objective is to assign participants to preference archetypes
characterizing the form of their other-regarding preferences, and we test
whether archetype assignments vary across treatments. Since assignment
to treatment is random, variation in revealed preferences across treatments
would signal that choices follow different preferences depending on the way
decisions are framed. As discussed in the research design section, this could
arise for various reasons, one of which is that different frames trigger different
heuristic norms of behavior. If we know what archetypes best capture the
behavior of a large fraction of the population in a given environment, we
may be in a better position to predict what types of behavior to expect in
that environment.
We selected the payoff matrices (or scenarios) used in the experiment so
as to facilitate the assignment of participants to a shortlist of commonly used
archetypes. Some of the archetypes we considered received no support in
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the data and are ignored here.10 The three archetypes on which we focus on
here are the following (as defined in Engelmann and Strobel, 2014, Charness
and Rabin 2002, Cooper and Kagel 2013):
1. Selfish: Chooses the allocation that maximizes own absolute payoff pii.
2. Invidious: Chooses the allocation that maximizes own relative payoff
pii −
1
3
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ni
pij .
3. Maximin: Chooses the allocation that maximizes the minimum payoff
among the four affected individuals maxminpij , j ∈ Ni. These preferences capture a simple form of inequalit
We seek to assign each participant to the archetype that best describes
their behavior over the six rounds. Different participants may follow dif-
ferent archetypes. We start by identifying participants who follow a single
archetype perfectly over the 6 rounds of the session, and we observe what
proportion of participants we can assign in this manner. We also report the
proportion of subjects whose behavior fits more than one archetype, and
which proportion fits none of them.11 Results are shown in Table 6.
The archetype most consistent with observed choices is the ‘selfish’ archetype,
with some systematic differences across treatments and types. Overall, fewer
participants are assigned to the selfish archetype in treatment T1 than in
other treatments. The difference is strongest for high types. This confirms
earlier results indicating that these participants behave in less selfishly when
the experiment is framed as an allocation process. Low types behave more
10We originally allowed for three archetypes in addition to the three listed here: (1)
efficiency-only (i.e., subjects choose the allocation that maximizes the total joint payoff);
(2) homophily (i.e., subjects choose a partner of the same high or low type); and (3)
equity-only (i.e., subjects choose the allocation that minimize absolute inequality defined
as
∑
j∈Ni
|pij − pii|). Because these archetypes have very low predictive power in our
sample, the ML search fails to converge when they are included.
11Formally, for each archetype k, we calculate ∆uki ≡ uk(pi
h
i )− uk(pi
l
i) where preference
function uk(.) is that corresponding to archetype k. For each subject we then count the
proportion of rounds for which the subject behaves in accordance to archetype k, that is,
for which yi = 1 if ∆u
k
i > 0 and yi = 0 if ∆u
k
i < 0. We then assign the archetype with the
highest count to the subject. If there are two or more with an equal number of counts, we
say that the subject fits multiple archetypes. We ignore cases in which ∆uki = 0 because
they are uninformative.
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selfishly than high types, again confirming earlier results. A sizeable pro-
portion of low payoff subjects exhibit invidious preferences, more often so
in T3, in line with earlier results. Maximin preferences are followed by a
non-negligible proportion of low types. For the latter, however, selfish and
maximin preferences typically coincide for low type subjects who, by con-
struction, have the lowest payoff.
At the bottom of the table we report the proportion of participants who
were assigned to multiple archetypes, and those whose behavior does not fit
any. We see that the behavior of low types often satisfies more than one
type. At the bottom of the table, we report the proportion of subjects failing
to fit any archetype. This typically arises because their behavior does not
follow one archetype consistently. A non-negligible proportion of subjects
fall into this category, especially in treatment T1.
One possible explanation for this is that people make mistakes: they may
have preferences that follow one of our archetypes but, due to inattention
or lack of interest, they occasionally make choices that do not correspond
to their underlying preferences. To further investigate this possibility, we
estimate a mixed maximum likelihood model. The details of the estimation
methodology are presented in Appendix 3. Estimates of posterior probabili-
ties are summarized in Table 7. We find that most participants fit the selfish
archetype best, but high types are less likely to act selfish in the allocation
treatment T1. In contrast, participants with the lowest average payoff (low
M types) overwhelmingly play selfish, even in T1. A number of players
are classified as having invidious preferences, but only in T3. Finally, we
find that a number of subjects in the low payoff category A are classified as
maximin players, especially in treatment T1. These results largely confirm
our earlier findings.
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4 Discussion and conclusions
We have reported on an experiment designed to test whether people ex-
hibit different other-regarding preferences depending on whether choices are
framed as allocation or match selection, and depending on the size of the
group from which they select a match. We find that when choices are framed
as match selection, agents are less likely to sacrifice their own material well-
being to increase the well-being of others. But some are more willing to
sacrifice a higher payoff to reduce the difference between their payoff and
that of others. Similarly, subjects behave more selfishly if they are in a
larger group setting.
These findings are broadly consistent with the literature on inequality
aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Okada and Riedl 2005), but with a
twist. Experimental subjects with a higher than average payoff exhibit some
altruistic or redistributive concerns, but more so when choices are framed
as an allocation problem. In contrast, when asked to select a partner in
a large anonymous setting, high payoff players seldom behave altruistically
and simply maximize their own material payoff. In contrast, subjects with
the lowest average payoff display no altruistic behavior or concern for effi-
ciency in a small group setting, but exhibit spiteful preferences in a large
anonymous setting. In other words, we get the two ‘sides’ of inequality
aversion (altruism and spite), but not in the same setting.
These findings have a number of implications. First, they suggest that
it may be possible to improve the allocative efficiency of first-come-first-
serve assignment processes in which some individuals are put in a position
to unilaterally select a match. In particular, consider assignment process in
which buyers enter a queue and only make a selection once they reach the
top of the queue. In the typical situation, the choices the buyer makes are
constrained by choices made by buyers whose turn came first – i.e., they
can only choose among what is left. But they are unconstrained by the
needs/willingness-to-pay/consumer surplus of buyers further down in the
queue. The evidence provided here suggests that making buyers aware of
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the consequences of their choices on others may alter their behavior in a less
rival, more altruistic direction – especially if their choices are couched as an
allocation decision involving multiple individuals, instead of a pure match
selection. For instance, someone at the head of the queue for a kidney
transplant may be asked to assign the kidneys that have become available
between themselves and the next individuals in the queue – instead of simply
selecting one kidney for themselves.
Secondly, our findings potentially cast some new light on the relation-
ship between altruistic preferences and the development of market insti-
tutions. Fafchamps (2011) argues that economic development requires a
change in allocation processes away from allocation within the household
or extended family to allocation within markets or within hierarchical orga-
nizations. This transformation requires a change in social norms from risk
sharing in long-term gift exchange to contract compliance in an anonymous
market setting. In a gift exchange allocation process, efficiency requires that
individuals make choices that are altruistic or efficiency-seeking. In market
exchange, efficiency can be achieved through competition alone; altruistic or
efficiency-seeking behavior is not required. To the extent that the behavior
of our experimental subjects can be interpreted as reflecting context-specific
norms, they fit this pattern to a large extent. We do, however, also find that
less fortunate participants occasionally select a partner so as to prevent them
from achieving a higher payoff. It is unclear whether competition is suffi-
cient to counter the inefficiency produced by such choices. More research is
needed.
The findings also raise a more fundamental question: Why, even with
minimal contextualization, do human subjects respond the way they do to
differences in the type of choice they make? Is it possible that the human
brain processes moral choices in a way that systematically reduces altruistic
behavior and reinforces spite in an anonymous partner-selection setting rel-
ative to a small group setting? This question is of policy relevance too and
related to the idea of nudging: Is it possible to nudge people into making de-
cisions that are more altruistic and efficient in situations that are essentially
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competitive?
The literature on trolley experiments (e.g., Greene 2012) suggests one
possible avenue of inquiry suggests that people care about their social im-
age and feel less guilty about the consequences of their actions when these
consequences seemingly depend on mechanical devices, random events, and
choices made by others.12 Andreoni and Berheim (2009) show that concerns
about being perceived fair sometimes dominate fairness concerns themselves.
The idea that people care about how their actions will be perceived is also
documented in Cox and Deck (2006) and Castillo and Leo (2010). Related
to this, Toussaert (2017) shows that noisier perceptions (due to difficul-
ties of signalling pro-socialiaty), discourage pro-social behavior. Delegating
decision-making has also been shown to induce more punishment and less
pro-social behavior (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). If correct, this inter-
pretation suggests that markets – and partner selection problems in large
populations – blunt other-regarding preferences by diluting the perceived
effect that actions have on the welfare of others, thereby eliciting less guilt
for failing to follow norms of acceptable behavior that apply in small groups.
We offer in Appendix 2 a simple model of such preferences.13 Further work
is needed on the origin of other-regarding preferences, and especially the ex-
tent to which they are shaped by the decision domains over which altruistic
norms apply.14
12Mikhael (2011) goes so far as to suggest that this is because the human brain processes
moral choices of cause and effect by applying syntaxic rules. This means that ‘pushing
the man to his death’ generates more guilt than ‘pushing the button that activates the
lever that opens the door that pushes the man to his death’ even though the ultimate
consequence is the same.
13The difference between treatments T2 and 3 similarly is in the process by which payoff
are generated, not in the actual payoffs themselves. Dilution as defined here can thus be
seen as a situation in which people’s preferences depend not just on payoffs but also on
the way these payoffs are obtained. If this interpretation is correct, this paper can be seen
as following in the footsteps of Charness and Rabin (2003) who demonstrated that people
have preferences over process, not just final outcomes.
14This line of thought also relates to recent work on how social preferences are shaped
by the risky nature of the environment. Brock et al. (2013) show that risk makes dictators
less altruistic; Cappelen et al. (2013) show that the nature of the risk (luck versus choices)
plays an important role in shaping social preferences.
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Appendix 2. Dilution and Accommodation
1. Dilution
In this Appendix we first illustrate how altruism or redistributive con-
cerns can become diluted in an anonymous partner-selection setting.15 We
then compare this pure dilution effect to a related effect whereby subjects
fool themselves that others will accommodate their selfish choice.
The trolley experiments (e.g., Greene 2012, Mikhael 2011) suggest that
people feel less guilt when the consequences of their action involve mechan-
ical devices, random events, or choices made by others. This suggests that,
say, pushing an anonymous person to their death generates more guilt than
pushing a button that randomly selects one of M anonymous persons to
be pushed to their death. A similar contrast characterizes the difference
between treatments T2 and T3: selecting in T2 a partner that leaves other
experimental subjects a lower payoff may generate more guilt than indi-
cating in T3 a preference for a partner type that, de facto, removes one
partnership from the choice set of others and has similar consequences on
randomly selected individuals.
To illustrate how this idea can be formalized, we construct preferences
in which individuals value the consequence of their action on others differ-
ently depending on whether they affect, with certainty, one person or one
of M randomly selected individuals. Let W2(h) denote the utility gain from
choosing a ‘high’ partner h instead of a ‘low’ partner l. Consider treatment
T2 and let this choice be efficient, so that for a subject with sufficiently
altruistic preferences, we have:
W2(h) ≡ pi
h
i − pi
l
i + β
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ni
(pihij − pi
li
j ) > 0
where β ≤ 1 is a parameter capturing the strength of redistributive concerns,
Ni is the set of four subjects that includes i, and pi
hi
j − pi
li
j is the effect that
player i has on the payoff of player j in Ni when choosing h.
15More sophisticated models can be written – e.g., models in which subjects have pref-
erences on whether they interfere or not with other subjects’ choices – but they would
take us too far from the object of this paper, which is primarily empirical.
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In treatment T3, the effect on the payoff of others is essentially the same
as in treatment T2 but i does not know which exact players will be affected.
The expected efficiency gain from choosing a partner h can now be written:
W3(h) ≡ pi
h
i − pi
l
i + β
24∑
j 6=i,j=1
E[pihij − pi
li
j ]
Realized payoffs are as in treatment T2, but the identity of the three in-
dividuals affected by i’s decision has not yet been determined. It is this
difference that opens the door to a possible dilution effect as follows.
Let us first consider i’s randomly assigned partner and, without loss of
generality, assume that this person belongs to category M . The effect of i’s
choice on this person’s payoff is pihij −pi
li
j ; other possible highM partners are
unaffected by i’s decision so that for them the effect is 0. The total effect of
i’s choice on the expected payoff of high M subjects is thus:
6∑
j=1
E[pihij − pi
li
j ] =
6∑
j=1
1
6
(pihij − pi
li
j ) = pi
hi
j − pi
li
j (2)
Similar calculations can be done for subjects in the other two category ×
type groups. We get:
W2(h) =W3(h)
which predicts that, in the absence of dilution, individuals should make
identical decisions under treatments 2 and 3.
Let us now introduce a dilution parameter α ≥ 1 and rewrite (??) as:
6∑
j=1
Eα[pihij − pi
li
j ] =
6∑
j=1
(
1
6
)α
(pihij − pi
li
j ) ≤ pi
hi
j − pi
li
j (3)
with strict inequality if α > 1. The effect on the other two category ×
type groups can be handled in the same way. Equation (??) is equivalent to
positing that individuals underweight the probability that they affect other
players, and is formally similar to probability weighting in prospect theory.
With α large enough,
∑
6
j=1
(
1
6
)α
(pihij − pi
li
j ) tends to 0 and we have:
W3(h) = pi
h
i − pi
l
i
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which corresponds to selfish preferences: with enough dilution, people no
longer take into account any efficiency cost they impose on others, and
pursue their own material welfare only.
2. Accommodation vs dilution
We now turn to the accommodation hypothesis. At first glance it appears
that treatments T2 and T3 are fundamentally different in the sense that, in
T3, how my choice affect others depends on the actions of others while in
T2 it does not. This turns out to be largely an illusion, but showing this
rigorously is rather intricate. Although nothing of importance hinges on
this issue for our results, we discuss it here in some detail, lest it become a
distraction for the reader.
We first show that, if players have the same preferences, T2 and T3 are
identical in the sense that my choice affects three other players. The only
difference is that, in T3, these players are yet to be determined. We then
allow for the possibility that players have different preferences, and we intro-
duce the concept of accommodation. Finally we show that, in expectation,
there is, if anything, more accommodation in T2 than in T3. To the best of
our knowledge, these concepts have never been formalized before.
Developing some intuition
Since all subjects in T3 play the same scenario, players in the same
category (A or M) and type (high or low) face the same payoff structure.
It follows that, if they all have the same preferences, they should make the
same choice. If they make the same choices, the impact on others’ payoffs
in T3 is the same as in T2: if I take an attractive partner for myself, this
attractive partner is not available to someone else and, at the margin, this
forces two other players into a less profitable pairing. The only difference is
that, in T3, the identity of these players is determined by chance after I have
made my choice while in T2 the identity of these players is determined by
chance before I have made my choice. Since the identity of other players is
never revealed, the two should be equivalent – except for the dilution effect
(see above).
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If we allow players to have different preferences, I could delude myself
into thinking that, while I am acting to maximize my own payoff, others
are not – in which case my choice may be accommodated by the unselfish
choice of others. In other words, I could hope to free ride on another player’s
altruism.16 Consequently, in T3 subjects may convince themselves that they
are only affecting one participant’s payoff as long as there exists other players
who exactly complement their choice. Because players face the same payoff
structure, such beliefs are largely wishful thinking, however: why would I be
the only one who is selfish. But accommodation opens the possibility that
players make choices based on their (possibly self-serving) beliefs about how
others play.
It therefore appears that how people play in T3 depends on expectations
about others’ actions while in T2 it does not. This is largely an optical illu-
sion, though. When a player acts selfishly in T2, he may similarly convince
himself that others in his group would accommodate his choice – so that
he has no determinant effect on the payoffs of other players because these
players would accommodate his choice. To illustrate, imagine two grooms
and two brides, as in T2. Groom 1 selects the handsomest bride for himself,
de facto forcing the other groom to pair with the less desirable bride. Yet
groom 1 can convince himself that this is precisely the bride that groom
2 would have selected, no matter how unlikely this possibility may be. In
other words, in both treatments 2 and 3 subjects can delude themselves that
others will make choices that render their own decision unconstraining.
Having presented the argument in an intuitive manner, we now offer
a slightly more rigorous treatment of accommodation, while discussing its
relationship with the dilution hypothesis. To recall, we define dilution as the
property by which people put less weight on affecting two individuals each
with probability 1/2 than on affecting one individual with probability 1. We
define accommodation as expecting that other players will accommodate my
preferences so that I can pretend to myself that I did not deprive anyone
16Or, alternatively, I could hope that my altruism is accommodated by someone else’s
selfishness.
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and I can therefore ignore the consequences of my choices on others.
Accommodation
To formalize the above intuitive argument, we need to distinguish be-
tween what i’s preferences are with respect to others’ payoff, and the real-
ization that other individuals may choose something else than what i would
choose in their place, that is, the possibility that others players have differ-
ent preferences. To demonstrate this, without loss of generality we examine
what is i’s gain from playing high instead of low:
W i3(h) ≡ pi
hi
i − pi
li
i + β
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
E[pihij − pi
li
j ]
= M ii + β
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
E[M ij ]
where pihij is the payoff to j if i chooses to play high (i.e., to select a high
type partner), pilij is j’s payoff if i plays low, N is the number of players in
the game and M ij ≡ pi
hi
j − pi
li
j .
The whole issue is how E[M ij ] is calculated. To illustrate how this mat-
ters, we now assume that the rules of T3 apply but we vary N . We focus
on i, and assume for simplicity that his choice is selected first.
We start by considering the case where N = 4 (as in T2). There are
three other players apart from i. Let m be the partner selected by i and
let k be the player of the same category (A or M) as i but of the opposite
type. In T3, the choices of i and k are first collated. If i chooses high and
k chooses low, then both their choices are accommodated. Hence player i
only directly affects the payoff of one person, i.e., the high player in the
other category. In contrast, if i and k choose high, their selections are in
conflict and only one of them can be implemented. Imagine that i’s choice
is selected. In this case, his choice determines the payoffs of all four players.
This examples shows that i’s choice only affects three other players if k does
not accommodate his choice.
Let us now assume that k accommodates i’s choice (i.e., chooses low)
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with probability p. We have:
W i3(h) =M
i
i + βM
i
m + pβ0 + (1− p)β
N∑
j 6=i,m,j=1
E[M ij ]
We immediately see that T3 creates an accommodation effect: when player
k accommodates i’s choice, i can imagine that his choice has no effect on k
and the partner that player k chooses. In other words, whatever effect i’s
choice has on players k and his partner can be ‘blamed’ on k’s choice, not
on i’s. As this example illustrate, this accommodation effect is present in
T2 as well, depending on i’s thought process. The key idea is that i can
blame someone else for some of the choices made, and this reduces the sense
of responsibility i feels for the effect of his choice on others.
This reasoning can be generalized to more players. For instance, consider
the case in which N = 8 and continue to assume that i plays high and that
other k players choose low with probability p. There are three possible
choice vectors for the three k players: {high, high, high} which happens
with probability (1− p)3, {high, high, low} which happens with probability
p(1− p)2 , {high, low, low} which happens with probability p2(1− p) , and
{low, low, low} which happens with probability p3. We see that if the other
three players exactly accommodate i’s choice (i.e., the {high, low, low} case),
i can imagine that his choice has no effect at the margin on k players (and
hence on anyone except m) since k players got their choice. In other cases,
i’s choice has an effect at the margin but only with a certain probability.
A simple example
This probability can be calculated for a simple example. Imagine 2N
players asked to choose between two possible prizes, chocolate or marmite,
each available in quantity N . Each player expresses a choice for one of them.
Let M be the number of players who choose marmite. If there is excess
demand for marmite, i.e., if M > N , the prizes are assigned at random
(as is done in T3) such that the probability of getting marmite is N/M for
someone who chooses marmite. Similarly ifM < N , chocolates are assigned
at random. If M = N everyone gets their choice.
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Now consider i’s choice and imagine that i derives disutility from prevent-
ing another player from getting his choice. For simplicity let this disutility
be D. Similarly let −D be the utility player i derives from helping another
player get his preferred choice. Without loss of generality, imagine that i
prefers marmite and let i’s payoff in this case be pi. Let other players’ choices
be Mi. If Mi = N − 1 then i can get marmite without preventing anyone
else from getting their choice. In this case, i’s payoff is pi. In contrast, if
Mi > N − 1, by choosing marmite, with probability 1 player i deprives one
other player from getting their preferred choice. Hence i’s payoff is pi −D.
Similarly, if Mi < N , that is, if most other players do not like marmite, by
choosing marmite i makes one other player happy with probability 1. Hence
i’s payoff is pi +D.
Now let p be the probability that other players like marmite. We have:
Pr(Mi = N−1) =
(
2N − 1
N − 1
)
pN−1(1−p)N =
(2N − 1)!
N !(N − 1)!
(1−p)[p(1−p)]N−1
since there are 2N − 1 players other than i. If N = 1 (i.e., there are two
players) the above boils down to:
Pr(Mi = N − 1) = Pr(Mi = 0) = 1− p
With two players only, there is a non-negligible probability that i’s choice
is accommodated by the other player. In contrast, if N is large, then Mi
2N−1
tends to p. In this case, if p > 0.5 player i knows that, with a very high
probability, he is taking marmite away from people who like it while if
p < 0.5 he knows he is leaving chocolate for people who like it. In other
words, if i has reasons to believe that p 6= 0.5 then the larger the group
is, the more likely i is to affect someone else’s choice. It follows that if i
believes that everybody likes marmite, or that everyone has the same taste
as he does, then i’s expected utility is pi−D while if he believes others dislike
marmite, his expected utility is pi +D.
If the game’s payoff is not a good but money, then player i would nor-
mally expect other players to prefer the choice that yields the highest mon-
etary payoff for them. In our example, if marmite is a higher monetary
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payoff, p > 0.5 and player i expects to take away from others’ payoff. It
follows from the above reasoning that, in a large group where one choice is
better for most other players, i expects to affect other players’ payoff such
that:
W3(h|N =∞) ≡ pi
h
i − pi
l
i + β
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
E[pihij − pi
li
j ]
≈ pihi − pi
l
i + β
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
4
N
(pihij − pi
li
j ) =W2(h)
In contrast, in a small group, say a group of 2, i could imagine that player
k will accommodate his choice. This occurs with probability 1 − p. Hence
i’s utility then is:
W3(h|N = 2) ≡ pi
h
i − pi
l
i + β(1− p)0 + βp
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
E[pihij − pi
li
j ]
which is a less other-regarding preference, i.e., it is equivalent to a smaller
β′ = βp. This means that the accommodation effect works in the opposite
direction from the dilution effect.
It is possible to show that for any p, the probability that other players
accommodate i’s selfish choice falls with N . Run the stata do file below for
an illustration:
clear all
set obs 101
gen p=( n-1)/101
forvalues i=1(1)6 {
gen b‘i’=binomialp(2*‘i’-1,‘i’-1,p)
}
sum b*
scatter b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 p
This shows that, if anything, accommodation is more likely in T2 than
in T3, so accommodation cannot be an explanation for dilution.
Conclusion
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1. If others’ payoff are monetary, then the utility of helping or hindering
others’ choices can be approximated by the effect on their payoff times
a welfare weight β. This simplifies the notation to W3(h|N).
2. If there is a large group, then the choice of i is nearly never indiffer-
ent (i.e., it is nearly never accommodated) unless p = 0.5 (or more
precisely some unique value N−1
2N−1
close to 0.5).
3. For groups of intermediate size (e.g., N = 6 as in T3) the probability
of accommodation is highest for p = N−1
2N−1
.
4. For groups of smallest size (N = 1 as in T2) the probability of accom-
modation is 1− p and thus is 1 for p = 0 and 0 for p = 1.
5. The probability of accommodation falls with group size: the larger the
group, the lower the probability of accommodation is for any p.
6. If players form rational expectations about others’ play, they will ex-
pect them to seek to improve their own payoff. Hence p >> 0.5 if
marmite/high partner is a better choice for the majority of players
in i’s category and type (who by experimental design share i’s payoff
structure). In this case, the probability of accommodation is low in all
games.
The bottom line is that accommodation cannot explain dilution since it
operates in the opposite direction.
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Appendix 3: Estimation of mixture model
The starting point of the estimation is the observation that:
Pr(yi = 1|pii, pij 6=i, Ti) =
K∑
k=1
Pr(yi = 1|pii, pij 6=i, Ti, k) Pr(u = uk|Ti) (4)
where pii and pij 6=i denote the three payoffs potentially entering the prefer-
ence utility uk of archetype k = {1, . . .K}. Since pii and pij 6=i are randomly
assigned in the experiment, we can ignore correlations between payoffs and
preferences. But we allow preferences to differ across treatments, hence the
conditioning on Ti. A similar probability can be derived for yi = 0. Since,
for a given treatment Ti, Pr(u = uk|Ti) is a constant, we denote it as γkT .
Next we assume that the probability of choosing action yi = 1 increases
in ∆uki , the utility gain from choosing yi = 1 that is associated with payoffs
pii and pij 6=i when preferences are given by uk(.). To formalize this idea, we
borrow from Luce (1959) and write:
Pr(yi = 1|pii, pij 6=i, Ti, k) =
eσT∆u
k
i
1 + eσT∆u
k
i
(5)
Parameter σT captures how sensitive decisions are to ∆u
k
i in treatment T .
If σT = 0, the choice between yi = 0 and yi = 1 is random and does not
depend on payoffs. If σT is arbitrarily large, expression (??) tends to 1 if
∆uki > 0 and to 0 if ∆u
k
i < 0 – which corresponds to the case where choices
are perfectly predictable. Intermediate values of σT capture situations in
which participants systematically diverge from random play in the direction
predicted by archetype k. The model assumes that participants are more
likely to follow the decision predicted by their archetype when the utility
gain ∆uki between the two choices is large. Mixed models have successfully
been fitted to experimental data (e.g., Andersen et al. 2008, Null 2012).
The likelihood function has the form:
L(γk, σ|yi, {∆u
k
i }, Ti) =
K∑
k=1
γkT
(
eσT∆u
k
i
1 + eσT∆u
k
i
yi +
1
1 + eσT∆u
k
i
(1− yi)
)
(6)
and is estimated separately for each treatment, ensuring that 0 < γkT < 1
and imposing that
∑K
k=1 γkT = 1.
17 Once σT and {γ1T , . . . γKT } have been
17Estimation is achieved by numerical optimization in Stata. To ensure that all ∆uki
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estimated, we compute, for each subject, the posterior probability that their
choices follows a particular archetype.18 Accumulating across rounds for
each individual i, the posterior probability that i follows archetype k is:
Pr(k|{yi}) =
Pr(k) Pr({yi}|k)
Pr({yi})
(7)
where {yi} = {y
1
i , y
2
i , . . . y
6
i } is the set of decisions made by i over the six
rounds. Since γ̂kT and σ̂T vary across treatment, Pr(k|{y}) also varies across
treatment for the same set of choices made. Once we have Pr(k|{y}) for each
subject, we look at how accurate the predictions are for different individuals,
i.e., how accurately they are estimated to follow a given archetype.
The first panel of Table 7 reports the average of estimated posterior
probabilities (??) calculated using parameters γ̂kT and σ̂T estimated using
(??). The second panel of the Table assigns each individual to an archetype
if their Pr(k|{yi}) exceeds 0.5 for one k – which can happen at most for one
k, but could happen for none.
have the same weight in the estimation, we normalize them to all have a unit standard
deviation. Convergence difficulties can arise when γkT ≈ 0 for some k, or when the ∆u
k
i
are too correlated across archetypes (akin to multicollinearity).
18Let Pr(k|yi = 1) denote the probability that individual i is of archetype k if he/she
sets y = 1. The starting point of our calculation is the following relationship that holds
for each choice i makes:
Pr(k|y = 1) =
Pr(k) Pr(y = 1|k)
Pr(y = 1)
=
Pr(k) Pr(y = 1|k)∑
k
Pr(k) Pr(y = 1|k)
For simplicity of exposition, we have omitted the dependence on pi and T . Unconditional
probability Pr(k) is estimated by γ̂kT while Pr(y = 1|k) is obtained from expression (??)
using estimated σ̂T .
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Table 2 – Scenarios, parameters and choice distribution 
 
   Positive sorting   Negative sorting 
Postive 
sorting 
efficient 
Sharing 
rule Share choosing  
Positive sorting 
Sc
en
ar
io
 
Bottom 
50% 
Top  
50% 
Bottom 
50% 
Top  
50% 
 
 
Yes / No 
 
Share  
Low in 
NS1 
Bottom 
50% 
Bottom 
50% 
Top  
50% 
 A M A M A M A M   A M A/M 
1 10 2 18 18 3 3 15 15 Yes 1/6 0.90 0.09 0.87 
2 12 4 16 16 3 3 15 15 Yes 1/6 0.92 0.73 0.80 
3 8 8 16 16 9 9 9 9 Yes 1/2 0.00 0.18 0.90 
4 10 2 12 12 2.5 2.5 12.5 12.5 Yes 1/6 0.82 0.00 0.41 
5 2 2 16 16 5 5 10 10 Yes 1/3 0.00 0.00 0.92 
6 6 6 12 12 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 Yes 1/2 0.17 0.18 0.96 
7 2 2 16 16 9 9 9 9 Equal 1/2 0.09 0.00 0.95 
8 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 3 3 15 15 No 1/6 0.89 0.91 0.05 
9 4 4 11 11 6 6 12 12 No 1/3 0.09 0.05 0.17 
10 8 2 10 10 9 9 9 9 No 1/2 0.30 0.00 0.73 
11 2.5 2.5 12.5 12.5 9 9 9 9 No 1/2 0.03 0.06 0.86 
12 8 2 10 10 3 3 15 15 No 1/6 0.90 0.04 0.13 
13 2.5 2.5 12.5 12.5 3 3 15 15 No 1/6 0.27 0.27 0.09 
14 3 3 15 15 8 8 16 16 No 1/3 0.09 0.09 0.28 
15 8 2 13 13 12 12 12 12 No 1/2 0.92 0.00 0.67 
16 9 9 9 9 4 4 20 20 No 1/6 0.08 0.09 0.24 
17 3 3 15 15 12 12 12 12 No 1/2 0.00 0.00 0.82 
              
1 The share is underlined if it is a sharing rule that would guarantee an efficient allocation with selfish preferences. 
 
Table 3. Proportion of choices that maximize the payoff of self or others 
 % of choices that maximize own payoff % of choices that maximize others' payoff 
 T3 T2 T1 χ2 test T3 T2 T1 χ2 test   
High payoff subjects 80.8% 84.8% 80.8% 1.93 52.7% 60.0% 68.9% 13.3    
    Nber of observations 276 282 234 0.377 264 270 222 0.001    
Low payoff A subjects 88.7% 90.9% 85.0% 2.16 43.6% 50.0% 57.5% 4.87    
    Nber of observations 133 132 120 0.340 133 132 120 0.088    
Low payoff M subjects 90.2% 94.9% 88.9% 3.46 40.2% 42.8% 46.0% 0.91    
    Nber of observations 132 138 126 0.177 132 138 126 0.634    
 
 
% of choices that maximize others' payoff: 
A. when this does not reduce own payoff 
% of choices that maximize others' payoff:  
B. when this reduces own payoff 
 T3 T2 T1 χ2 test T3 T2 T1 χ2 test   
High types 78.3% 89.5% 94.4% 17.09 17.9% 21.4% 36.1% 10.31    
    Nber of observations 152 153 125 0.000 112 117 97 0.006    
Low A types 83.1% 90.9% 93.2% 3.63 5.9% 9.1% 23.0% 9.63    
    Nber of observations 65 66 59 0.163 68 66 61 0.008    
Low M types 87.0% 94.8% 92.3% 2.24 7.7% 5.0% 13.5% 3.66    
    Nber of observations 54 58 52 0.326 78 80 74 0.160    
T3, T2 and T1 stand for treatment 3, treatment 2, and treatment 1, respectively. The two lower panels break down the 
upper right panel into cases where the altruistic choice does or does not reduce the subject's own material payoff. The χ2 
test columns report the test statistic for equality of means across treatments and, below it in italics, the corresponding p-
value of the test. Test statistics significant at the 10% or better appear in bold. 
  
 Table 4. Marginal effect of a payoff difference on the probability of choosing high 
    T3   T2   T1   
  
dy/dx t-stat. dy/dx t-stat. dy/dx t-stat. 
A. Marginal effect of own payoff 
difference: 
    
 
High type 6.4% 5.97 6.6% 8.41 6.1% 7.90 
 
Low A type 6.6% 16.64 6.6% 11.23 5.1% 8.81 
 
Low M type 5.1% 4.76 4.8% 3.30 5.4% 3.26 
B. Marginal effect of others' combined payoff difference: 
  
 
High type 0.0% 0.01 1.0% 2.35 1.5% 3.31 
 
Low A type -1.5% -3.76 -0.4% -0.91 0.4% 0.37 
  Low M type -0.9% -4.84 -0.7% -1.36 -0.1% -0.14 
Marginal effects from regression (1). 
     
Table 5. Regression of efficiency on treatment dummies 
      All subjects High payoff Middle payoff Low payoff 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Treatment T1 9.0% 3.64 10.9% 3.22 10.2% 1.84 4.2% 0.93 
Treatment T2 6.2% 2.79 5.8% 1.71 10.5% 2.24 2.9% 0.84 
Intercept = T3 60.8% 40.03 60.9% 25.99 59.4% 20.97 62.2% 23.72 
         Nber. Observations 1573   792   385   396   
Dependent variable = percentage of maximum achievable aggregate payoff. 
   Estimator is a LPM. Standard errors clustered at the participant level. 
     
Table 6. Assignment to archetypes, assuming no mistakes 
            All subjects   High types   Low A type   Low M type   
Archetype: T3 T2 T1 T3 T2 T1 T3 T2 T1 T3 T2 T1 
 
Selfish 57% 64% 45% 54% 53% 38% 50% 73% 55% 68% 78% 48% 
 
Efficiency only 0% 2% 4% 0% 4% 5% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Equity only 10% 7% 9% 2% 0% 0% 23% 14% 15% 14% 13% 19% 
 
Invidious 17% 12% 11% 4% 0% 0% 50% 41% 35% 9% 9% 10% 
 
Maximin 22% 23% 21% 2% 0% 8% 18% 14% 20% 68% 78% 48% 
 
Homophily 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 
Multiple archetypes: 
   
  
 
  
   
  
 
  
 
Fits more than one 27% 29% 21% 2% 0% 0% 36% 41% 35% 68% 78% 48% 
 
Fits none 31% 30% 43% 37% 40% 46% 32% 27% 35% 18% 13% 43% 
Number of observations 540 552 480 276 282 234 132 132 120 132 138 126 
 
  
Table 7. MLE Assignment of subjects to archetypes 
             Treatment T3     Treatment T2     Treatment T1     
Pr(Archetype) All High Low A Low M  All High Low A Low M  All High Low A Low M  
 
Selfish 73.9% 80.9% 57.2% 76.0% 79.6% 82.4% 78.6% 74.7% 59.3% 55.8% 51.5% 73.4% 
 
Efficiency only 1.1% 0.0% 4.6% 0.0% 4.3% 6.2% 0.8% 3.8% 5.9% 6.7% 7.8% 2.4% 
 
Equity only 1.3% 0.4% 4.3% 0.3% 1.8% 0.0% 6.8% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Invidious 15.8% 11.8% 27.1% 12.9% 2.3% 0.3% 1.0% 7.6% 9.1% 12.5% 3.6% 8.1% 
 
Maximin 5.0% 3.5% 6.8% 6.3% 10.9% 8.9% 12.8% 13.1% 14.1% 1.2% 37.1% 16.1% 
 
Homophily 2.9% 3.4% 0.0% 4.5% 1.1% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 11.6% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Predicted archetype 
    
  
  
  
    
 
Selfish 81.1% 89.1% 63.6% 81.8% 83.7% 83.0% 86.4% 82.6% 73.8% 64.1% 70.0% 95.2% 
 
Efficiency only 1.1% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 4.3% 6.4% 0.0% 4.3% 5.0% 7.7% 5.0% 0.0% 
 
Equity only 1.1% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Invidious 11.1% 4.3% 22.7% 13.6% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 8.7% 3.8% 5.1% 0.0% 4.8% 
 
Maximin 3.3% 4.3% 4.5% 0.0% 7.6% 8.5% 9.1% 4.3% 6.3% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
 
Homophily 2.2% 2.2% 0.0% 4.5% 1.1% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Nber observations 540 276 132 132 552 282 132 138 480 234 120 126 
Posterior probability of archetype based on mixed MLE model (see text for details). Parameters are estimated separately for each 
treatment. 
 Predicted archetype =1 if Pr(archetype)>0.5 and 0 otherwise. 
         
 
Appendix 4 – Experimental Instructions 
 
[TREATMENT 1] 
 
Centre for Experimental Social 
Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 
November2011 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please wait for the experimenter to indicate the start of the 
experiment. These instructions will be read aloud by the 
experimenter shortly. 
 
Dear participants, 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating to this experiment. Before we describe the experiment, 
we wish to inform you of a number of rules and practical details. 
 
Important rules 
 
 Your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to leave the room at any 
point if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you the show-up fee of £4.  
 Silence: Please do remain quiet from now on until the end of the experiment. You will 
have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes.  
 
 
What will happen at the end of the experiment 
 
Once the experiment is finished, please remain seated. We will need around 10 minutes to prepare 
your payment. We will move to another room and you will be called up successively by the number 
on your table (please take it with you as you leave the lab); you will then receive an envelope 
with your earnings and you will be asked to sign a receipt.  
 
 
 
Description of the experiment 
 
The experiment is structured in two stages. The first stage is called the production stage, you will 
be asked to do a calculation task for 3 minutes. The second stage is called the earnings division 
stage, where you will be asked how to divide earnings between participants. Both stages are 
important in determining your final earnings.  
 
STAGE 1: PRODUCTION STAGE 
Production here is achieved through two tasks: Adding and Multiplying numbers. Half of the 
participants will be asked to add numbers (“addition” task) and the other half will be asked to 
multiply numbers (“multiplication” task). The goal is to do as many calculations correctly as 
possible in 3 minutes. At the end of the 3 minutes, we will identify who are the TOP 50% best 
performers in each task and who are in the BOTTOM 50% performers in each task (that is, there 
will be ¼ of participants in the “TOP 50% multiplication”, a ¼ in the “TOP 50% addition”, a ¼ in 
the “BOTTOM 50% multiplication” and a ¼ in the “BOTTOM 50% addition”). 
 
STAGE 2: EARNINGS DIVISION STAGE 
In a second stage, you will be placed in groups of 4, each composed of  
- A TOP 50% “multiplication” participant 
- A BOTTOM 50% “multiplication” participant 
- A TOP 50% “addition” participant 
- A BOTTOM 50% “addition” participant 
 
You will be asked to choose between two allocations of earnings that differ by  
(1) the total amount of earnings to be divided 
(2) how it is allocated between the four people in the group 
 
We will present you with 6 scenarios. Each scenario corresponds to different joint earnings and 
different ways of dividing these earnings. All the participants in the session will receive the same 
scenarios (and these will be numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). You will have more than enough time 
(10 minutes in total) to study each of these scenarios carefully.  
 
Please report your preferred choice in each scenario. You will simply need to tick one of the boxes 
at the bottom of the answer sheet.  
 
After we have collected your answers for all 6 scenarios,  
 One of these 6 scenarios will be selected at random 
 For each group of four people, we will choose one person at random and implement 
her choice of allocation for the four people in her group.  
 
Note that the first line of the answer sheet will inform you privately about whether your 
performance was in the TOP 50% or BOTTOM 50% of your own group. 
We show you on the next page an example of answer sheet. 
 
The earnings are indicated in Experimental Currency Units. The exchange rate is £1=1.50 ECU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 You did the MULTIPLICATION task. 
Your performance in the first round was in the TOP 50% 
 
 
POSSIBLE EARNINGS DIVISION 1: Total earnings 48 
 
 
 
 
POSSIBLE EARNINGS DIVISION 2: Total earnings: 36 
 
 
 
 
INDICATE (WITH A TICK) WHICH EARNINGS DIVISION YOU PREFER: 
 
   Earnings division 1 
   Earnings division 2 
 
 
 
top 50% 
addition 
18
bottom 50% 
addition 
6
bottom 50% 
multiplication
6
top 50% 
multiplication 
18
top 50% 
addition, 9
bottom 50% 
addition, 9
bottom 50% 
multi-
plication 
9
top 50% 
multi-
plication 
9
At the very end, we will circulate a questionnaire that has no implications for your earnings. We 
would be grateful if you can fill it in carefully.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
STAGE 1: Production Stage (3 minutes) 
 
5 minutes break 
 
STAGE 2: Earnings Division stage (10 minutes) 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 5 
Scenario 6 
 
STAGE 3: Implementation  
In each group one person is selected to implement the earnings division 
One scenario is randomly selected to be implemented 
Choices are implemented 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Preparation of payment 
 
Payment 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room. 
[Treatment 2] 
 
Centre for Experimental Social 
Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 
November2011 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please wait for the experimenter to indicate the start of the 
experiment. These instructions will be read aloud by the 
experimenter shortly. 
 
Dear participants, 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating to this experiment. Before we describe the experiment, 
we wish to inform you of a number of rules and practical details. 
 
Important rules 
 
 Your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to leave the room at any 
point if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you the show-up fee of £4.  
 Silence: Please do remain quiet from now on until the end of the experiment. You will 
have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes.  
 
 
What will happen at the end of the experiment 
 
Once the experiment is finished, please remain seated. We will need around 10 minutes to prepare 
your payment. We will move to another room and you will be called up successively by the number 
on your table (please take it with you as you leave the lab); you will then receive an envelope 
with your earnings and you will be asked to sign a receipt.  
 
 
 
Description of the experiment 
 
The experiment is structured in two stages. The first stage is called the production stage, you will 
be asked to do a calculation task for 3 minutes. The second stage is called the partnership 
formation stage, where you will be asked with whom you would like to form a partnership. Both 
stages are important in determining your final earnings.  
 
STAGE 1: PRODUCTION STAGE 
Production here is achieved through two tasks: Adding and Multiplying numbers. Half of the 
participants will be asked to add numbers (“addition” task) and the other half will be asked to 
multiply numbers (“multiplication” task). The goal is to do as many calculations correctly as 
possible in 3 minutes. At the end of the 3 minutes, we will identify who are the TOP 50% best 
performers in each task and who are in the BOTTOM 50% performers in each task (that is, there 
will be ¼ of participants in the “TOP 50% multiplication”, a ¼ in the “TOP 50% addition”, a ¼ in 
the “BOTTOM 50% multiplication” and a ¼ in the “BOTTOM 50% addition”). 
 
STAGE 2: PARTNERSHIP FORMATION STAGE 
In a second stage, you will be placed in groups of 4, each composed of  
- A TOP 50% “multiplication” participant 
- A BOTTOM 50% “multiplication” participant 
- A TOP 50% “addition” participant 
- A BOTTOM 50% “addition” participant 
 
You will be asked to form a partnership with a person who performed a different task than yours 
(addition or multiplication). The joint earnings will depend on the performance of both partners 
in the first stage. More precisely, the joint earnings will depend on whether: 
 Both are in the TOP 50%,  
 One is in the TOP 50% and the other is in the BOTTOM 50%,  
 Both are in the BOTTOM 50%.  
 
We will give you a choice between forming a partnership with a person from the TOP 50% or with 
a person from the BOTTOM 50% in the other task. Each partnership will be associated with a 
given division of earnings in the group, which will be clearly indicated.  
 
We will present you with 6 scenarios. Each scenario corresponds to different joint earnings and 
different ways of dividing these earnings in the group. All the participants in the session will 
receive the same scenarios (and these will be numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). You will have more 
than enough time (10 minutes in total) to study each of these scenarios carefully.  
 
Please report your preferred choice in each scenario. You will simply need to tick one of the boxes 
on the answer sheet.  
 
After we have collected your answer sheet for all 6 scenarios,  
 One of these 6 scenarios will be selected at random 
 For each group of four people, we will choose one person at random and implement 
her choice. For example, if the person selected at random prefers to form a partnership 
with the person from the TOP 50% in the other task, then automatically the two people 
from the BOTTOM 50% will be matched to each other. 
 
Note that the first line of the answer sheet will inform you privately about whether your 
performance was in the TOP 50% of BOTTOM 50% of your own group. 
We show you on the next page an example of an answer sheet. You will have two answer sheets 
per page corresponding to 2 different scenarios.  
 
 
 
 You did the MULTIPLICATION task.  
Your performance in the first round was in the TOP 50% 
 
DIVISION OF EARNINGS IF YOU FORM A PARTNERSHIP WITH TOP 50% ADDITION 
TOP 50% ADDITION 
& TOP 50% MULTIPLICATION (YOU) 
JOINT INCOME: £32 
BOTTOM 50% ADDITION 
& BOTTOM 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: £4 
TOP 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    £16 
YOU 
 
 
£16 
BOTTOM 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    £2 
BOTTOM 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
£2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIVISION OF EARNINGS IF YOU FORM A PARTNERSHIP WITH BOTTOM 50% ADDITION 
TOP 50% ADDITION 
& BOTTOM 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: £18 
BOTTOM 50% ADDITION 
& TOP 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: £18 
TOP 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    £9 
BOTTOM 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
£9 
BOTTOM 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    £9 
YOU 
 
 
£9 
  
 
Indicate (with a tick) with whom you would prefer to form a partnership: 
   TOP 50% “ADDITION” 
   BOTTOM 50% “ADDITION” 
 
At the very end, we will circulate a questionnaire that has no implications for your earnings. We 
would be grateful if you can fill it in carefully.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
STAGE 1: Production Stage (3 minutes) 
 
5 minutes break 
 
STAGE 2: Partnership Selection stage (10 minutes) 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 5 
Scenario 6 
 
STAGE 3: Implementation  
In each group one person is randomly selected to be the leader in partnership selection 
One scenario is randomly selected to be implemented 
Choices are implemented 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Preparation of payment 
 
Payment 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room. 
[Treatment 3] 
 
Centre for Experimental Social 
Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 
May 2011 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please wait for the experimenter to indicate the start of the 
experiment. These instructions will be read aloud by the 
experimenter shortly. 
 
Dear participants, 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating to this experiment. Before we describe the experiment, 
we wish to inform you of a number of rules and practical details. 
 
Important rules 
 
 Your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to leave the room at any 
point if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you the show-up fee of £4.  
 Silence: Please do remain quiet from now on until the end of the experiment. You 
will have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes.  
 
 
What will happen at the end of the experiment 
 
Once the experiment is finished, please remain seated. We will need around 10 minutes to 
prepare your payment. We will move to another room and you will be called up successively by 
the number on your table (please take it with you as you leave the lab); you will then receive 
an envelope with your earnings and you will be asked to sign a receipt.  
 
 
 
Description of the experiment 
 
The experiment is structured in two stages. The first stage is called the production stage, you 
will be asked to do a calculation task for 3 minutes. The second stage is called the partnership 
formation stage, where you will be asked with whom you would like to form a partnership. Both 
stages are important in determining your final earnings.  
 
STAGE 1: PRODUCTION STAGE 
Production here is achieved through two tasks: Adding and Multiplying numbers. Half of the 
participants will be asked to add numbers (“addition” group) and the other half will be asked to 
multiply numbers (“multiplication” group). The goal is to do as many calculations correctly as 
possible in 3 minutes.  
 
At the end of the 3 minutes, we will identify in each group who are in the TOP 50% best 
performers and who are in the BOTTOM 50%.  
 
STAGE 2: PARTNERSHIP FORMATION STAGE 
In a second stage, you will be asked to form a partnership with a person from the other group 
than your own (addition or multiplication). The joint earnings will depend on the performance of 
both partners in the first stage.  
 
More precisely, the joint earnings will depend on whether: 
 
 Both are in the TOP 50%  
 One is in the TOP 50% and the other is in the BOTTOM 50%  
 Both are in the BOTTOM 50%  
 
We will give you a choice between forming a partnership with a person from the TOP 50% or 
with a person from the BOTTOM 50% from the other group. Each partnership will be associated 
with a given division of earnings, which will be clearly indicated.  
 
We will present you with 6 scenarios. Each scenario corresponds to different joint earnings and 
different ways of dividing these earnings between you are your partner. All the participants in 
the session will receive the same scenarios (and these will be numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
You will have more than enough time (10 minutes in total) to study each of these scenarios 
carefully.  
 
Please report your preferred choice in each scenario. You will simply need to tick one of the 
boxes at the bottom of the answer sheet.  
 
After we have collected your answers for all 6 scenarios,  
 One of these 6 scenarios will be selected at random 
 One of the groups (Addition / Multiplication) will be selected at random and the 
partnerships and earnings divisions will be implemented according to the preferred 
choices of the selected group.  
 
Note that the first line of the answer sheet will inform you privately about whether your 
performance was in the TOP 50% of BOTTOM 50% of your own group. 
 
Finally, note that earnings will be indicated in experimental currency units (ECU). The exchange 
rate is £1 = ECU 1.5 
 
We show you on the next page an example of answer sheet. 
 
 
 
 You are part of the MULTIPLICATION group. 
Your performance in the first round was in the TOP 50% 
 
If your group is chosen to lead the partnership selection, your income will depend on whom you form 
a partnership with in the Addition group. We indicate below how the earnings will be distributed 
between the partners, depending on who is matched with whom.  
TOP 50% ADDITION 
& TOP 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: ECU 32 
BOTTOM 50% ADDITION 
& BOTTOM 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: ECU 4 
TOP 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    ECU 16 
TOP 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
ECU 16 
BOTTOM 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    ECU 2 
BOTTOM 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
ECU 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOP 50% ADDITION 
& BOTTOM 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: ECU 18 
BOTTOM 50% ADDITION 
& TOP 50% MULTIPLICATION 
JOINT INCOME: ECU 18 
TOP 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    ECU 9 
BOTTOM 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
ECU 9 
BOTTOM 50% 
ADDITION 
 
    ECU 9 
TOP 50% 
MULTI- 
PLICATION 
ECU 9 
  
 
INDICATE (WITH A TICK) WITH WHOM YOU WOULD PREFER TO FORM A 
PARTNERSHIP: 
   A person from the TOP 50% of the “Multiplication Group” 
   A person from the BOTTOM 50% of the “Multiplication Group” 
 We will implement these preferred choices insofar as possible. If there is a shortage of partners 
of a given type (either “Top 50%” or “Bottom 50%”), the most demanded partners will be 
allocated between those who demand them in a random manner. For example, suppose 
“Addition” is randomly selected for the partner selection. We will randomly choose a first person 
in the Addition group and implement her/his choice and match him/her to a random person 
from her preferred type (top 50%/bottom 50%). We repeat this for each person in the Addition 
group one by one. If we cannot accommodate the choice because the demanded type is not 
available anymore, we will match the person with the other type.  
 
At the very end, we will circulate a questionnaire that has no implications for your earnings. We 
would be grateful if you can fill it in carefully.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
STAGE 1: Production Stage (3 minutes) 
 
5 minutes break 
 
STAGE 2: Partnership Selection stage (10 minutes) 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 5 
Scenario 6 
 
STAGE 3: Implementation  
One group is randomly selected to be the leader in partnership selection 
One scenario is randomly selected to be implemented 
Choices are implemented 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE (10 minutes) 
 
Preparation of payment (10 minutes) 
 
Payment (10 minutes) 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and wait for the experimenter to come to you. 
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room. 
